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The Iraq War as a System Power Move

March 17, 2026

Because I have been so firmly opposed to the Iraq war, I have failed to appreciate it for what itis: a classic system power move. An embarrassing oversight on my part, since, for over three decades, we have been teaching the concept of system power move in our Power Labs, even encouraging participants to explore the possibility of such moves in the program in their organizations, and elsewhere in their lives. How one feels about the power move evidently depends on whether you are the actor or the acted-upon. With regard to the Iraq war, I have felt very much the acted-upon.

System power moves are outrageous acts. What makes them outrageous is that they are unilateral; others are not asked their opinion or permission; and if contrary opinions are offered, they are ignored. Power moves are outrageous because they are acts against current reality, challenging what are widely viewed as acceptable bounds. Anwar Sadat breaks rank and announces his willingness to go to Jerusalem; Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation; Rabin agrees to negotiate with Arafat; the United States, essentially unilaterally, launches a preemptive war against Iraq. Historically such moves are often seen as courageous and statesman-like, but in the moment they are experienced by many within their own constituency as irresponsible, unilateral, dangerous, against tradition, manipulative, possibly immoral, and as risking an uncertain future.

The essential purpose of all system power moves is to disrupt the status quo and fundamentally transform system conditions. Elsewhere we've describe the process as jolting the system "from an unsatisfactory but predictable present to an unpredictable but more malleable future."

This was the intention behind the power move of the Iraq war: to fundamentally transform the Middle East, to make it a less dangerous place, a place less hospitable to terrorism and anti-Americanism, a place less vulnerable to disruptions in oil supply, and a place more hospitable to commerce. Better business, however, was not a selling proposition to the American public; if put to a vote, it would have gone down to defeat. The overwhelming majority of Americans would have been unwilling to sacrifice lives and treasury in support of such a remote and to them abstract geopolitical goal. The power move needed to be cloaked in a more acceptable disguise: fear (protecting us from those non-existent weapons of mass destruction),righteous anger (overthrowing a despicable mass murdering tyrant, not even among the top five most despicable tyrants in the world), and revenge (imaginatively linking Iraq to the attacks of 9/11.)These were more concrete and immediate motives that more Americans (still less than a majority) could get behind.

To date the move has been very costly in terms of American, coalition, and Iraqi deaths and injuries, in terms of the dislocation and disruption of lives and the destruction of property. But the move has been successful in upsetting the status quo and opening the Middle East to what is hoped to be a more malleable future.

"The concept of power move will always be controversial as a legitimate aspect of system leadership, and it is unwise for the leader to ask permission or expect appreciation. Few of us enjoy being acted on; there is something distasteful about unilateral actions (What happened to democracy, one person/one vote, consensus?) There are legitimate arguments to be made for involvement, participation, and consensus; yet there are other situations in which involvement, participation, and the need for consensus will guarantee that nothing productive will happen."

Leading Systems: Lessons from the Power Lab

The Iraq system power move is still in play and will eventually be judged in terms of what form this now malleable future takes.

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